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Abstract.  This paper explores the rationale of price-taking and price-making 
behaviours in the context of Walrasian and Cournotian pure exchange economies. 
Beside the influence of the number of agents, we underline the role of the structure 
of preferences. Through three equilibrium variations of the same basic economy, we 
obtain several results about price manipulation, about asymptotic identifications for 
large economies and for degenerate preferences, and about welfare comparisons. 
Perfect competition does not only correspond to the case of large economies, but 
may also concern economies where market powers are more or less equivalent. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In Debreu’s Theory of Value (1959), perfect competition is formally defined
1. 
There are a finite number of agents (consumers and firms) and a finite list of 
goods. Each good is associated a single price expressed in a numéraire. Perfectly 
competitive behaviour is then put forward. Each rational consumer selects the net 
transactions that maximise her/his utility under the assumptions that unlimited 
quantities can be bought or sold at the specified prices and that these plans do not 
influence the profits received. Equivalently, each rational firm selects the inputs 
and outputs that maximise its net receipts, given it can buy and sell any quantities 
without manipulating prices. A Walrasian equilibrium is characterised by a price 
vector and perfectly competitive individual choices such that all markets 
simultaneously clear. 
 
Two essential specificities of perfectly competitive economies are their major 
results of Pareto optimality and their specific assumption of absence of strategic 
behaviour. If the welfare properties are endogenously explained, the competitive 
behaviour assumption may appear as an enigmatic principle. For what type of 
economies is the parametric behaviour founded? Under what conditions is perfect 
competition justified? More substantially, is a competitive economy an economy 
where agents have no market power, or an economy where they do not use the 
market power they may have? These questions might justify the attempts to find 
some strategic foundations for the competitive behaviour, possibly considered as a 
limiting case of a more general theory of markets (see Gale (2000)). In the 
                                                 
1 This point is developed by Arrow and Hahn (1971) and discussed in Roberts (1989).   3
literature, the concept of perfect competition is often justified by economic 
negligibility of any agent and characterises economies with numerous agents 
(Mas-Colell (1982)).  
 
Two major lines of research were developed throughout the literature in order 
to give a rational foundation to perfect competition. The relation between the core 
and the competitive allocations has been studied in the perspective of the 
asymptotic approach through replication procedure by Debreu and Scarf (1963) 
and also with the atomic approach where the set of agents is indexed by a 
continuum with an atomless measure space (Aumann (1964)). In these 
Edgeworthian perspectives, the price-taking and the coalitional strategic 
behaviours can be identified under individual negligibility and for a great number 
of traders. The second line of research introduces non cooperative strategic 
behaviour, turning the Walrasian equilibrium into a type of Cournotian general 
equilibrium
2. We here focus on the approach opened by Gabszewicz and Vial 
(1972) in an economy with production and pursued by Codognato and 
Gabszewicz (1991), (1993) in the context of pure exchange economies. Different 
concepts of Cournot-Walras equilibria can be developed, depending on the way 
strategic behaviour is introduced (see Gabszewicz and Michel (1997))
3. In these 
general equilibrium Nashian perspectives, the Cournot-Walras equilibria can be 
identified to the competitive equilibrium in the case of large economies. 
 
                                                 
2 This field of research mixing the general approach à la Walras and the little number competition 
à la Cournot is not unified. Opened by Shapley and Shubik (1977), the strategic market games 
treat all traders symmetrically and allow them to manipulate the price structure. It essentially aims 
at replacing the Walrasian auctioneer. Another view, particularly developed by Gabszewicz 
(2002), considers that the behaviour of agents is no longer symmetric, ‘significant’ agents trying to 
manipulate the price system. 
3  These authors define a general notion of non cooperative equilibrium for a quantity setting 
oligopoly in pure exchange economies. They thus capture a large variety of market structures.   4
The objective of this paper is to question the rationale of price-taking or price-
making behaviour in the framework of general equilibrium oligopoly, when all 
traders may or may not manipulate the price of the good they own. We thus 
consider a class of pure exchange economies with two goods similar to these 
analysed in Gabszewicz (2002). About endowments, the market sizes are the same 
in the economy, the market shares are the same in each sector, but the market 
concentration may be different or identical between the two sectors. About 
preferences, we assume an identical Cobb-Douglas specification for every 
individual and discuss the role of the α  parameter as an index of the preference 
of good 1 relatively to good 2. Regarding three variations of this pure exchange 
economy, we obtain the following results. First,  compared to the level of the 
competitive price, the level of the oligopoly price is in favour of the oligopolists 
when they trade with price-takers. Second, the oligopoly behaviour tends to the 
competitive behaviour when the number of agents goes to infinity. Third, the 
oligopoly behaviour tends to the competitive one when the preferences of agents 
are strongly unbalanced. Fourth, there is no possible Pareto domination among 
the four equilibria, but between the competitive equilibrium and the symmetric 
oligopoly equilibrium. We show that price-taking behaviour does not only 
concern large economies, but maybe also economies where market powers are 
more or less equivalent. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we determine three distinct 
types of equilibrium for the considered pure exchange economy and give several 
results. In section 3, in reference with these three concepts of equilibrium, we 
finally discuss the rationale of perfect competition and price-taking behaviour.    5
 
2. Three variations on a pure exchange economy 
 
Consider a pure exchange economy with two consumption goods (1 and 2) and 
(m+n) consumers. We assume the following Cobb-Douglas specification for the 
utility function: 
α α − =
1
2 1 h h h x x U   , 1 0 < <α   , h ∀ .                               (1) 
The structure of the initial endowments is assumed to be the same as in the 
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It is assumed that good 2 is taken as the numéraire, so  p  is the price of good 1 
as expressed in units of good 2. We consider three versions of the economy, each 
corresponding to an equilibrium concept: the competitive or the Walrasian one, 
the asymmetric oligopoly or the Cournot-Walras ones and the symmetric 
oligopoly or the Nash-Walras one. 
 
2.1. Walrasian equilibrium 
In this context, the behaviour of each agent is competitive. Thus the individual 
plans come from a non-strategic maximization of the utility subject to the budget 
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where  1 h z  and  2 h z   respectively represent the competitive supply of good 1 by 
agent  h,  m h ,..., 2 , 1 = , and the competitive supply of good 2 by agent h, 
n m m h + + = ,..., 1 . From (3) and (4), we deduce the competitive individual offer 
plans and the demand functions: 
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The competitive equilibrium price 
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p . We deduce the competitive 
equilibrium allocations: 
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The utility levels reached by each type of agents are respectively 
m U h / α =
∗ , m h ,..., 2 , 1 =  and  n Uh / ) 1 ( α − =
∗ , n m m h + + = ,..., 1.  
 
2.2. Cournot-Walras equilibria 
The agents who have an endowment in good 1 adopt a strategic behaviour in 
manipulating the price by means of the quantity of good 1 they offer, whereas 
agents who have an endowment in good 2 behave competitively. We denote  1 h s    7
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Under this assumption, a Cournot-Walras equilibrium is given by a m -uple of 
strategies ) ,..., , ( 1 21 11 m s s s ) ) ) , with  [ ] m sh / 1 , 0 1 ∈ ) ,  m h ,..., 2 , 1 = , and an allocation 
m
m IR x x x
2
2 1 ) ,..., , ( + ∈ ) ) )   such that (i)  ) , ( 1 1 h h h h s s x x − = ) ) )  and  (ii) 
() () ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 h h h h h h h h s s x U s s x U − − ≥ ) ) ) ,  m h ,..., 2 , 1 = , where  1 h s−  denotes the strategy 
of every agent who owns a quantity of good 1 and who is different from agent h. 
The non-cooperative equilibrium is associated to the resolution of the 
simultaneous strategic programmes: 
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All the agents of the same sector being identical, we have  1 1 ˆ ˆ h h s s − = , so the m 
equilibrium strategies are: 
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We thus have: 
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The individual allocations are: 
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It is also possible to consider the other asymmetric case, where the strategists 
are the last n agents, the first m agents behaving as price-takers. We denote  2 h s  
the pure strategy of agents  n m m h + + = ,..., 1 , with  [ ] n sh / 1 , 0 2 ∈ . The optimal 
strategies and the price are then  ) ( / ) 1 ( 2 α α − − = n n n sh
( ,  n m m h + + = ,..., 1  and 
)] /( ) 1 )][( 1 /( [ α α α − − − = n n p ( . The allocations and the utility levels are 
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2.3. Nash-Walras equilibrium 
We here consider that each agent is an oligopolist and behaves strategically. 
Each agent h tries to manipulate the price by contracting his/her supply. The 
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Under that assumption, a symmetric oligopoly equilibrium is a  ) ( n m+ -uple of 
strategies ) ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ,..., ~ ( 2 12 1 11 n m m m s s s s + + , with  [ ] m sh / 1 , 0 ~
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[] n sh / 1 , 0 ~
2 ∈  for  n m m h + + = ,..., 1 , and an allocation 
) ( 2
1 1 ) ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ,..., , ~ (
n m
n m m m IR x x x x
+
+ + + ∈   such that (i)  ) ~ , ~ ( ~
1 1 h h h h s s x x − =  and 
() () ) ~ , ( ) ~ , ~ ( 1 1 1 1 h h h h h h h h s s x U s s x U − − ≥  for  m h ,..., 2 , 1 =  and  (ii)  ) ~ , ~ ( ~
2 2 h h h h s s x x − =    9
and  () () ) ~ , ( ) ~ , ~ ( 2 2 2 2 h h h h h h h h s s x U s s x U − − ≥  for  n m m h + + = ,..., 1 . The non-
cooperative equilibrium is associated to the resolution of the simultaneous 
strategic programmes: 
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which gives the following optimal strategies: 
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The individual allocations are: 
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The three variations on the considered pure exchange economy lead to the 
following four results. 
 
Result 1.  Compared to the level of the competitive price, the level of the 
oligopoly price is in favour of the oligopolists when they trade with price-takers. 
 
Proof. The price level depends on either strategic or competitive aggregate 
supplies of goods 1 and 2: 
∗ ∗ ∗ = 1 2 / z z p ,  1 2 /s z p ) ) ) = ,  1 2 / z s p ( ( ( =  and  1 2






h h z z





m h h z z




h h s s
1 1 1




m h h z z
1 2 2





h h z z
1 1 1




m h h s s
1 2 2




h h s s
1 1 1




m h h s s
1 2 2
~ ~ . First, 
∗ > p p )  
because 
∗ < 1 1 z s )  and 
∗ = 2 2 z z ) . Second, 
∗ < p p (  because 
∗ = 1 1 z z (  and 
∗ < 2 2 z s ( . Third, 
p ~  may be bigger or equal or smaller than 
∗ p  as 
∗ < 1 1
~ z s  and 
∗ < 2 2
~ z s . 
 
The oligopolists “à la Cournot” try to influence the price level in the direction 
that favours them by a contraction of their supply (see Gabszewicz (2002)).  
 
Result 2. The oligopoly behaviour tends to the competitive behaviour when the 
number of agents goes to infinity. 
 
Proof. For every kind of equilibrium concept, let’s denote by E the set of 
equilibrium outcomes, i.e.  { } U x p E , , = , where p is the relative price, x is the 
allocation and U is the associated utility level in each case. It is easy to verify that 
∗
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The price making behaviour and the price taking behaviour lead to supplied 
quantities that tend to be identical in large economies. This happens because when 
the number of agents on the considered side of the exchange is “very” big, 
adopting a strategic behaviour is no longer effective and is eventually equivalent 
to adopting a parametric behaviour. 
 
Result 3. The oligopoly behaviour tends to the competitive behaviour when the 
preferences of the agents are strongly unbalanced. 
 
Proof. When  0 → α ,  1 1
~
h h s s = )  tends to  1 1 h h z z ( =
∗  , m h ,..., 2 , 1 = ∀ . So, E ˆ  tends 
to 
∗ E  and  E
~
 tends  to  E
(
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~
h h s s = (  tends  to  2 2 h h z z ) =
∗ , 
n m m h + + = ∀ ,..., 1 . So, E
(
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~
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)
. Moreover, we can 
easily verify that  n n p p p p / ) 1 ( ) / ( lim ) / ~ ( lim
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The price making behaviour and the price taking behaviour lead to supplied 
quantities that tend to be identical for the sellers of a strongly undervalued good. 
This happens because when the good supplied by the considered side of the 
exchange is strongly depreciated, adopting a strategic behaviour is no longer 
effective and is eventually equivalent to adopting a parametric behaviour
4.  
 
                                                 
4 About the price limits for limit values of α , one might notice the following three cases (i) 
) 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ( ) ~ , , , ( lim
0 =
∗
→ p p p p
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→ p p p p
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α   and (iii) if  2 / 1 = α , then 
1 =
∗ p .   12
Result 4. There is no possible Pareto domination among the four equilibria, 
but between the competitive equilibrium and the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium. 
 
Proof. We state the proof in three steps. First, we show that there is no Pareto 
domination between the Walrasian equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilibria. 
Second, we show that there is no Pareto domination between the Nash-Walras 
equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilibria. Third, we show that the Nash-
Walras equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the Walrasian equilibrium only in the 
case of a neutralisation of the relative advantages based on the agents’ preferences 
and on the number of agents. 
Step 1:   {}
α α)] 1 ( /[ − − =
∗ m m U U h h
)
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∗ > h h U U
)
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again reverse for  h U
(
.  
Step 3 has two parts. We firstly show that the Nash-Walras equilibrium is 
Pareto dominated by the competitive equilibrium when there no net relative 
advantage on one side of the market. The neutralisation of the relative advantages 
between the two kinds of agents might be translated by 
∗ = p p ~ , which is 
equivalent to  ) 1 /( )] 1 ( )].[ /( ) 1 [( 1 − − − − − = m m n n α α . Does this imply 
∗ < h h U U
~  
for  m h ,..., 2 , 1 =  and 
∗ < h h U U
~
 for  n m m h + + = ,..., 1?  W e  s e e  t h a t  
∗ = p p ~  is 
equivalent to  ) 1 /( )] 1 ( )].[ /( ) 1 [( 1 − − − − − = m m n n α α . We have 
∗ < h h U U
~
 for   13
m h ,..., 2 , 1 =  if and only if  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 α
α α − − < −
− m m m . This leads to prove that 
)] 1 /( [ 1 )] 1 /( 1 1 [ − + < − + m m α
α . Define  ) 1 log( ) 1 log( ) ( x x x α α + − + ≡ Γ , where 
) 1 /( 1 − = m x , with  1 0 ≤ < x . We must verify that  0 ) ( < Γ x  when  ] 1 , 0 ] ∈ x . As 
0 ) 0 ( = Γ  and  0 )] 1 )( 1 /[( ) 1 ( ) ( '
2 < + + − = Γ x x x α α α , we have  0 ) ( < Γ x , ] 1 , 0 ] ∈ ∀x . 
The argument is similar for  n m m h + + = ,..., 1 . Secondly, the absence of Pareto 
domination between the two equilibria means that 
∗ > h h U U
~
 for  m h ,..., 2 , 1 =  and 
∗ < h h U U
~
 for  n m m h + + = ,..., 1  (or conversely). Little algebra shows that these 
two inequalities require 
α α ) / 1 1 ( ) / 1 1 (
1 m m − < −
− . If  2 / 1 = α  (absence of relative 
advantage due to preferences), this condition stands if  n m <  (relative advantage 
due to the endowments in favour of the m first agents). If  n m = , this condition 
stands if  2 / 1 > α . The argument is similar for 
∗ < h h U U
~
 for  m h ,..., 2 , 1 =  and 
∗ > h h U U
~
 for  n m m h + + = ,..., 1.   
 
3. Competitive or strategic behaviour: fundamental and behavioural market 
powers 
 
In the models developed, the strategic behaviour brings a higher satisfaction 
compared to the competitive behaviour under two kinds of condition. Firstly, the 
absence of evanescence of the effectiveness of the oligopoly behaviour is required. 
For the strategic behaviour to be effective, it must imply a significant contraction 
of the offer in order to really push for a more favourable price. This sensitive 
reduction of the supply occurs for the first type of agents when good 1 is not 
greatly unappreciated (α  does not tend to 0) and when the supply of good 1 is not 
very scattered (m  is finite). It occurs for the second type of agents when good 2 is   14
not greatly unappreciated (α  does not tend to 1) and when the supply of the good 
2 is not very scattered (n is finite). Secondly, the absence of neutralisation of the 
price manipulation is needed, in case this strategy would be engaged at the same 
time by the two types of agents. The reduction of the supply must indeed involve 
a more favourable price for the strategic behaviour to be efficient. The 
achievement of such an advantageous price occurs for one kind of agents when 
the other kind has a parametric behaviour. 
 
But what is the relevance of each type of behaviour and of each concept of 
equilibrium? More specifically, under what conditions are the price taking 
behaviour and the Walrasian equilibrium justified? A first way to answer these 
problems is to emphasize the institutional framework of each equilibrium concept. 
In particular, one might say that the Walrasian equilibrium is grounded when all 
the logistics of the tâtonnement is truly at work, around the auctioneer (see Arrow 
(1959)). A second way is to determine the conditions under which the different 
types of equilibrium outcomes would be relevant. We follow throughout the paper 
this latter logic.  Different non-cooperative approaches have been conceived in the 
literature
5 . We here propose to explore some strategic and non-strategic 
foundations of price-taking behaviour. 
 
Three elements have been considered: the possible agents’ relative preference 
for one good, the comparative numbers of suppliers in sectors 1 and 2 and the 
                                                 
5  Postlewaite and Roberts (1976) show that the utility gain that each agent can achieve in 
manipulating prices through the adoption of a non-competitive behaviour tends to zero as the 
number of consumers becomes large, so she/he acts as a price taker. Through a dynamic matching 
and bargaining framework, Gale (2000) shows how strategic interactions between rational agents 
can lead to price-taking behaviour. Another argument, based on the ‘non surplus condition’, is 
developed by Ostroy and Makowski (2001).   15
either competitive or strategic behaviour of each kind of agents. And we have 
seen that the four types of price are functions of these involved parameters, i.e. 
) (α
∗ ∗ = p p , ) , ( m p p α ) ) = , ) , ( n p p α ( ( =  and  ) , , ( ~ ~ n m p p α = . In order to analyse 
the relations between all these elements, let’s propose a basic distinction about 
market power for the pure exchange economy previously developed. One might 
call  fundamental market power the relative advantages grounded on the 
fundamental elements identifying the agents (preferences and endowments), and 
behavioural market power the adoption of the strategic price-making behaviour, 
or the rejection of the parametric price-taking behaviour.  
 
The value of α  represents the unanimous preference for good 1 relatively to 
good 2
6. When  1 → α , good 1 is commonly more appreciated, so the initial 
owners of commodity 1 detain a relative fundamental market power. When 
0 → α , such a market power is granted to the initial owners of good 2. Finally, 
when α  is around 1/2, the two goods are equally valued by all the consumers, so 
there is no relative fundamental market power due to preferences.  
 
The specification of the endowments gives the structure of the private property: 
each agent owns only one good and a same part as every other agent of the same 
sector
7. The comparative value m/n represents the relative degree of concentration 
of sector two compared to sector one. When  n m < , sector one is more 
concentrated and that might be provide a fundamental market power to the owners 
                                                 
6 We could have introduced another utility function for agents who own good 2 under the form 
β β − =
1
2 1 h h h x x U  with  α β ≠ , in order to model heterogeneity in preferences or differentiation in the 
structure of preferences. The results are not affected by this modification. 
7 Agents’ negligibility then emerges when m and n go to infinity. The concept of negligibility has 
been largely developed in the literature devoted to the relation between the Edgeworthian core and 
the Walrasian allocations.   16
of good 1. Conversely, when  n m > , sector one is less concentrated, and that 
might involve a fundamental advantage for the agents of sector 2. When  n m = , 
the two sectors are equivalently concentrated, so there is no relative advantage 
due to the distribution of initial endowments.  
 
Preferences and endowments may provide, or not (when  2 / 1 = α  and  n m = ), 
a relative fundamental market power. They may play in the same direction (for 
example when  1 → α  and  n m < ), giving rise to a reinforced relative fundamental 
market power. They might also play in opposite directions (when  1 → α  and 
n m > ), giving rise to a net relative fundamental market power being zero, or 
positive for the agents owning good 1, or positive for the agents owning good 2.  
 
The adoption of a strategic behaviour implies the endeavour either to create or 
to develop a relative exchange advantage on the others. Conversely, the adoption 
of a competitive behaviour either reveals a naïve belief (each agent takes the 
given price as granted or true), or means a pacific attitude (each agent will not try 
to push some objective relative exchange she/he might have).  
 
Two different views can be developed about the possible link between these 
two types of market power. According to the first one, the fundamental market 
power and the behavioural one are independent, and the adoption of a strategic 
behaviour is just a question of pure individual choice. According to the opposite 
view, the behavioural market power must be based on a net relative fundamental 
market power, and the adoption of a strategic behaviour is a simple consequence 
of a net relative advantage. Let’s now develop these alternative views.   17
 
If taking or making the price is a matter of choice, then we might consider 
some game-theoretic foundation of the types of behaviour, leading to a strategic 
justification of the types of equilibrium. Let i be a representative agent of the first 
m agents, and j a representative agent of the last n agents. Players i and j have the 
options to be either price-taker (PT) or price-maker (PM). The following matrix 
represents the simultaneous meta-game, where the associated payoffs are the 
utility levels reached by each type of agent under the four equilibria
8: 
 
               j 
   
 i 
 
      PT  
 
      PM 
 
PT     ) , (
∗ ∗
j i U U  
 














( j i U U  
  
Both agents have PM as a dominant strategy. This gives a strategic foundation 
of the PM behaviour and a justification of the Nash-Walras equilibrium. Moreover, 
from result 4 (see section 2), we know that the strategies PM-PM may constitute 
or not an optimal situation. If there is a net fundamental relative advantage in 
favour of one sector, then the equilibrium is optimal and the game features an 
invisible hand structure. In the opposite case, the equilibrium is not optimal, as it 
is dominated by PT-PT, and the game features a prisoner’s dilemma structure.  
 
Alternatively, if taking or making the price is a given structural characterisation, 
then it is an exogenous element. There is nevertheless a way to justify it, as a 
consequence of an objective basis. In case of a net fundamental relative advantage 
                                                 
8 There are two versions of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium (see section 2.2).   18
for one kind of agents, the asymmetric Cournot-Walras equilibrium is justified: 
the advantaged type of agents becomes the price making side of the exchange, the 
disadvantaged agents taking the price made by the others as given. In case of a 
zero net relative fundamental advantage for any kind of agents, a symmetric 
equilibrium is justified: either the Nash-Walras equilibrium or the Walrasian 
equilibrium (especially when there is no fundamental market power of any kind). 
The idea that the behavioural market power needs to be backed up by the 





The common view in economics states that the price taking behaviour is 
relevant when the number of agents is ‘very’ big, because in these limit 
circumstances the strategic behaviour is no longer effective, and meets the 
competitive behaviour. Our analysis leads us to suggest a possible extension of 
the validity field of perfect competition.  
 
Beyond the usual cases of large economies, the cases of homogeneous 
economies ( 2 / 1 = α  and  n m = ), may also be situations for which the Walrasian 
conception is relevant, both for behavioural and fundamental reasons. Under a 
normative point of view, in these homogeneous economies, the Walrasian 
equilibrium dominates the Nash-Walras equilibrium: the universal price-taking 
behaviour is more efficient than the universal price-making behaviour. Under a 
positive point of view, if the asymmetric equilibrium concepts such as the   19
Cournot-Walras equilibrium match heterogeneous economies, the symmetric 
equilibrium concepts such as the competitive equilibrium or the Nash-Walras 
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